Discounting in Mortgage Markets by Jason Allen et al.
 
Working Paper/Document de travail 
2011-3 
Discounting in Mortgage Markets 
by Jason Allen, Robert Clark and Jean-François Houde 
 
   2
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2011-3 
February 2011 




2 and Jean-François Houde
3 
  1Financial Stability Department 
Bank of Canada 












Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in 
economics and finance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. 
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. 
 
ISSN 1701-9397  © 2011 Bank of Canada  
   ii
Acknowledgements 
Jason Allen thanks UW-Madison and HEC-Montreal for their hospitality while writing 
this paper. Robert Clark thanks HEC Montréal for funding. This research has benefited 
from the financial support of the NSF (SES-1024840). We thank the Canadian Mortgage 
and Housing Corporation and Genworth Financial for providing us with the data. We are 
especially indebted to Nick Ricketts and Benoit Sanscartier for their help with the CMHC 
data set. We are indebted to Stuart Levings, Winsor MacDonnell and Joanna Sunderland 
for their help with the Genworth data set. We also thank Allan Crawford, Pierre Duguay, 
Walter Engert, Ron Morrow, and Pierre St-Amant for their consistent effort on this 
project. We thank seminar participants at the Bank of Canada, FTC, DePaul University, 
University of Alberta, Lakehead University, Boston University, New York University, 
and the Invitational Choice Symposium (Miami) for their comments. We greatly 
benefited from discussions with Jim Day, Kim Huynh, Jonathan Levin, Hector Perez-
Saiz, Greg Tkacz, and Virginie Traclet. All errors are our own.   iii
Abstract 
This paper studies discounting in mortgage markets. Using transaction-level data on 
Canadian mortgages, we document that over time there’s been an increase in the average 
discount, along with substantial dispersion. The standard explanation for dispersion in 
credit markets is that lenders engage in risk-based pricing. Our setting is unique since 
contracts are guaranteed by government-backed insurance, meaning risk cannot be the 
main driver of dispersion. We find that mortgage rates depend on individual, contractual, 
and shopping market characteristics. There is also an important amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity in rates, which could be attributed to search costs. 
JEL classification: D4, G21, L0 
Bank classification: Financial institutions; Financial services 
Résumé 
Les auteurs étudient les rabais consentis sur les taux hypothécaires affichés. Au terme 
d’un examen détaillé des transactions hypothécaires conclues au Canada, ils constatent 
une hausse du rabais moyen au fil du temps ainsi qu’une forte dispersion des rabais 
accordés. Cette dispersion sur les marchés du crédit est généralement attribuée à la 
différenciation des prix que les prêteurs pratiqueraient en fonction du risque. L’approche 
adoptée ici est novatrice en ce que les contrats hypothécaires bénéficient d’une assurance 
garantie par l’État, de sorte que le risque ne peut être le principal déterminant de la 
dispersion. Les auteurs concluent que les taux hypothécaires dépendent des 
caractéristiques des ménages et des prêts ainsi que des particularités du marché local. Une 
bonne partie de l’hétérogénéité des taux s’explique également par des caractéristiques 
non observées, peut-être liées aux coûts de recherche. 
Classification JEL : D4, G21, L0 
Classification de la Banque : Institutions financières; Services financiers 
 
 1 Introduction
In many markets prices are determined through a negotiation process between buyers and
sellers. Sellers post a price, but consumers may be able to negotiate a discount. The extent
to which sellers are willing to discount may depend on consumer, contractual, and market-
structure characteristics. This type of pricing behavior can be found, for example, in the
markets for automobiles, houses, consumer loans, health insurance, and personal ﬁnance.
In this paper we study discounting in the market for mortgages. Our focus is on the
Canadian mortgage market. In Canada the primary originators of mortgages operate na-
tional branch networks and set national posted rates even though the underlying economic
conditions across regions can diﬀer substantially. Local branch managers are then given the
authority to bargain with potential customers for individual rates. This process results in
a substantial amount of dispersion in the discounts received by diﬀerent borrowers. The
coeﬃcient of variation for discounts in 2004, for example, was 82 per cent. Moreover, this
dispersion leads to economically important diﬀerences in the costs of ﬁnancing the purchase
of a home. Given an average loan of 147,781 dollars in 2004, the extra term interest cost of
paying the rate associated with the 75th percentile discount rather than the 25th percentile
discount is 9,235 dollars. The full amortization interest cost (over 25 years) on this mortgage
is 32,831 dollars.
Extensive rate dispersion has also been documented in other credit markets (see for
instance Edelberg (2006) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009)). These papers attribute
most of the observed dispersion to the ability of lenders to sort borrowers according to their
level of risk. The development of ‘risk-based pricing’ has been facilitated by technological
advances that make credit scoring much less costly than it was twenty years ago and has
been encouraged by the fact that it can be signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable than uniform pricing
(Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2009) study pricing and contract design in the subprime auto-
1sales market and ﬁnd that using credit scoring to determine down-payment sizes can increase
proﬁts by 22 per cent relative to uniform pricing).
Our analysis makes use of detailed transaction-level data on mortgages administered by
what were during our sample the only government-guaranteed mortgage insurance providers
in Canada. Our setting is therefore unique since the loans we study are all fully insured,
meaning that risk-based pricing does not explain all of the observed dispersion in rates.
The objective of this paper is to provide a set of stylized facts regarding dispersion in
the mortgage market in an eﬀort to highlight the factors other than risk that might be
explaining rate dispersion. Our analysis provides evidence that the remaining variation
reﬂects either (i) heterogeneity in consumer preferences (in search costs, in bargaining ability,
and in willingness to pay for bank characteristics), or (ii) heterogeneity in the proﬁtability
of each contract for the lender (in terms of prepayment and complementary services, and
of future renegotiation value). It is certain that these factors are present in other credit
markets also, but their eﬀect on rate dispersion is being confounded with that of risk.
Our data set contains information on mortgage, household, and market structure char-
acteristics which allows us to quantify these diﬀerent dimensions. We ﬁnd that rates are
higher in more concentrated markets, and that banks discriminate between consumers based
on loyalty, age, and ﬁnancial constraints. The ways in which these household characteristics
inﬂuence rates are all consistent with the idea that lenders evaluate the current and future
proﬁtability of borrowers when deciding on rates.
We also ﬁnd that without conditioning on loan characteristics higher income households
pay less for their mortgage than do lower income households. However, once we condition
on loan size and house price we ﬁnd that richer households actually pay the highest rates.
We also ﬁnd that borrowers that use mortgage brokers pay lower rates. These results are
consistent with a model of search where borrowers with low search costs gather multiple
quotes and negotiate large discounts. We provide further evidence of this using quantile
2regressions which show that the marginal eﬀects of the observable characteristics vary across
rates. Consumers who search a lot get a rate close to marginal cost (the 5 year bond
rate) regardless of their characteristics. Since the marginal eﬀects are all close to zero for
those consumers that engage in search, it is clear that they have extracted all of the rents.
Irrespectively of their characteristics or the characteristics of the local market, informed
consumers will always receive a good rate from the lender.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Canadian banking indus-
try, focusing on the residential mortgage market. Section 3 presents a description of the
household-level data, including trends in the Canadian mortgage market. Section 4 describe
the determinants of discounts. Section 5 concludes. Tables and ﬁgures are collected in the
Appendix.
2 The Canadian Mortgage Market
2.1 Market Structure
The Canadian mortgage market is dominated by the “Big 6” Canadian banks (Bank of
Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Banque Nationale, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,
Royal Bank Financial Group, and TD Bank Financial Group), a regional cooperative network
– Desjardins – and a provincially owned deposit-taking institution – Alberta’s ATB Financial.
Collectively, they control 90 per cent of assets in the banking industry and are called the
“Big 8.” Their dominance stems from the period of consolidation that occurred in the early
1990s when the large banks acquired nearly all of the trust companies who until that point
had played an important role in the mortgage market. Poor loans in the 1980s left the trust
companies or their holding companies in ﬁnancial distress. As a response to these troubles,
and to the fact that trust companies had an unfair legislative advantage when it came to
making loans (having to do with reserve requirements), legislative changes took place in 1992
3to allow banks to enter the trust business.
2.2 Mortgage contracts
The majority of Canadians sign 5-year ﬁxed rate mortgages that are rolled over with new
5-year ﬁxed rate contracts for 25 years (typically). Every 5 years the rate is renegotiated,
which in eﬀect acts like an adjustable rate mortgage with a ﬁxed time-frame to renegotiate.
The longer term mortgages that are the norm in the United States were phased out in the
late 1960s in Canada after lenders experienced diﬃculties with volatile interest rates and
maturity mismatching. Unlike in the United States, mortgage interest payments are not tax
deductible in Canada and Canadian lenders do not use a “points” system.
The long-term mortgage contracts available in the United States largely spurred the
innovation of securitization. Securitization is a process where mortgages (or any loans) are
packaged and sold as a security, or tranches of securities, to investors. These mortgage-
backed securities are a source of long-term funding for lenders, better matching the maturity
of the mortgage. The maturity mismatch between 30 year mortgage contracts and short-
term deposits was especially expensive for lenders in the 1970s when interest rates were
both volatile and increasing rapidly.1 In Canada, mortgage contracts were already short-
term, so there was less of a need for securitization. The level of securitization in both
countries, therefore, is dramatically diﬀerent. In 2004, 11 per cent of mortgages in Canada
were securitized whereas in the United States it was over 50 per cent (Engert and Freedman
2003). Securitization has important implications for the loan process, such as bundling
the loan application decision, the provision of funds, and the credit exposures (Engert and
Freedman 2003). Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010b), for example, found that in
the U.S. securitization decreased lending standards. As articulated in Keys, Mukherjee,
1The Community Reinvestment Act in the United States also constrained balance-sheet funding of mort-
gages by forcing banks to use local deposits to make local loans. Securitization was one way for banks to
access outside funding.
4Seru, and Vig (2010a), however, this only happened, at least up until 2006, for subprime
mortgages sold to private investors in the non-agency (non-GSE) market. In Canada the
insurer (CMHC or Genworth) has the ﬁnal decision on whether a mortgage application is
accepted and mortgages that are securitized are almost always insured.2 In Canada minimum
lending standards set by the government remained constant during our sample period and
were relaxed only slightly post-2006. Given both the lack of data on securitization and its
level of importance to the Canadian banking industry any potential eﬀect of the increase in
securitization on discounting is subsumed by time trends rather than captured explicitly in
our econometric speciﬁcations.
2.3 Mortgage Insurance
Mortgage products oﬀered by Canadian lenders fall into two broad categories: conventional
mortgages (low loan-to-value), that are typically uninsured but can be privately insured,
and high loan-to-value mortgages, that require insurance. In Canada the federal government
guarantees about 73 per cent of residential mortgages (2009) and over 80 per cent of new
home-owners purchase mortgage insurance.3 This is because mortgage insurance is required
for households borrowing more than 75 per cent (in 2007 this was changed to 80 per cent) of
the cost of the home from a regulated ﬁnancial institution. Mortgages are insured by either
the government insurer, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), or the private
insurer, Genworth Financial Canada. In both cases mortgages are explicitly insured by the
government of Canada. Genworth Financial entered the Canadian market in late 1995 and
grew to about one-third of the market.
2Lenders can purchase insurance, called portfolio insurance, on conventional mortgages in addition to
high-LTV loans if they wish to securitize these as well.
3The percentage of government guaranteed mortgages is calculated as total insurance in force over total
residential mortgage credit. As of 2009 CMHC had 473 billion CAD, Genworth 224 billion CAD and Canada
Guaranty about 5 billion CAD of insurance in force in a market of 965 billion CAD.
5The insurance companies charge a premium based on the household’s mortgage contract.4
The insurance premium is typically rolled into the mortgage and ﬁnanced over the full
amortization. In addition to the 75 per cent LTV rule mentioned above, there are also a
number of other eligibility guidelines that should be met for mortgage loan insurance. A
household should have a debt service to gross income ratio of less than 32 and a total debt
service ratio of less than 40.5
If a borrower defaults the lenders’ actions depends on whether the contract was insured
or not. In the case of default on insured mortgages, the insurer pays 100 per cent of all
eligible claims and costs. Therefore for insured mortgages lenders are protected against the
high costs associated with default, such as repossessing the home and ﬁnding a new buyer.
In the case where a borrower defaults on an uninsured mortgage the lender takes possession
of the home and would presumably try to sell it on the open market.
2.4 Pricing and Negotiation
Since most Canadian banks operate nationally, posted prices are common across the country.
Lenders typically post the mortgage rate for their diﬀerent products on a weekly basis in
both national and local newspapers, as well as online. This is diﬀerent than in the United
States, where even national lenders such as Bank of America post diﬀerent mortgage rates
on their web-site depending on a consumer’s zip code.6
There is little dispersion in posted prices, especially among the Big six ﬁnancial institu-
tions. In fact, the coeﬃcient of variation on posted rates for the Big six during the early part
of our sample period is always around zero. Allen and McVanel (2009) provide a detailed
analysis of movements in Canadian banks’ posted rates. Most of the time (between 63 and
4The premium ranges from 1.75 to 3.25 per cent for the most common mortgage types.
5Gross debt service is deﬁned as principal and interest payments on the home, property taxes, heating
costs, annual site lease in case of leasehold, and 50 per cent of condominium fees. Total debt service is
deﬁned as all payments for housing and other debt.
6Canadian banks operating in the U.S. also use this strategy for their U.S. locations.
666 per cent depending on the term), posted prices do not change from week to week. When
prices do change, only 6 per cent of the time do we observe only one bank adjusting its rates.
Therefore, in shopping for a mortgage contract one option for consumers is to pay the
posted price of their home bank or of some rival bank. However, in Canada this is not
their only option. Local branch managers have the authority to oﬀer borrowers discounts
below the posted price under general guidelines from headquarters. Rather than settle for
the posted price consumers can instead try to obtain mortgage contracts with lower rates.
There are two ways for them to do this.
One approach is to hire a broker to search for the best rates on their behalf. Unlike in
the United States, brokers in Canada have ﬁduciary duties. Brokers are compensated by
lenders, but “hired” by borrowers to gather the best quotes from multiple lenders. Typically,
brokers are compensated between 1-1.3 per cent of the volume of mortgages that they bring
to a lender. Borrowers could potentially hire several brokers, something we cannot observe.7
Rather than hire a broker, a borrower can instead search independently to obtain a list
of quotes. There are two main forces inﬂuencing the rate quote(s) received by borrowers: (1)
their preferences – namely search costs, bargaining ability, and valuation of bank services,
and (2) their current and future proﬁtability. The burden of gathering multiple quotes lies
on consumers and there is heterogeneity is the cost of search across consumers. Consumers
also diﬀer in their bargaining ability and their valuation of various services related to the
ﬁnancial institutions themselves. For instance, there may be heterogeneity in their valuation
of the branch/ATM network (since some may value being able to easily access a branch
while others may do all of their banking online), their valuation of the other loan services
provided by lenders or wealth management services. Finally, some consumers may have a
7In contrast, in the U.S. brokers receive both a cash-fee from the borrower and a yield-spread premium
from the lender. The yield-spread premium is an increasing function of both the loan size and the interest
rate, therefore brokers in the U.S. do not have an incentive to ﬁnd borrowers the lowest rate (e.g. Hall and
Woodward (2010)).
7higher willingness to pay to have a mortgage contract with their current ﬁnancial institution.
Branch managers try to screen consumers based on their search costs, their valuation
for their services, and their observable characteristics, and then evaluate the proﬁtability
of signing particular borrowers to mortgage contracts. Branch managers have an incentive
to oﬀer larger discounts to consumers who have gathered, or have the potential to gather,
multiple rate quotes, and to those that are, or will be more proﬁtable to the bank. On the
other hand, negotiating larger discounts is costly for the bank and can reduce the commissions
earned by branch employees (see KPMG (2008)).
The proﬁtability of a mortgage contract signed between a particular borrower and a
particular lender can be broken down into three components: (i) proﬁts stemming directly
from the contract, (ii) proﬁts stemming from the purchase of complementary services, and
(iii) proﬁts stemming from future mortgage contracts signed between the two parties. Proﬁts
stemming directly from the contract depend on the revenues and costs it generates. Since
the vast majority of mortgages in Canada are ﬁve-year ﬁxed rate terms, in most cases direct
revenue depends only on the size of the loan and the interest rate charged. Lenders must
also consider the risk of default on the contract. However, since the contracts in our sample
are all fully insured, default is less of a concern for lenders. There is though some risk
of prepayment by the borrower which would reduce the revenue earned directly from the
mortgage contract. More speciﬁcally, in some cases borrowers will contribute over and above
their monthly payment to pay down the mortgage more quickly than the lender expected.8
8It is standard for borrowers to be granted a 15 per cent (and sometimes as high as 20 per cent) prepayment
option per year. This means that a lump sum of 15 per cent of the original principal value can be paid down
in any year of the contracted-term. Any unused prepayment room expires at the end of each year. Note
that this prepayment risk is diﬀerent than the risk most often discussed in the U.S. banking industry. In
the U.S. the concern is that when interest rates decrease, consumes will attempt to pay down their entire
mortgage and reﬁnance. This is of little concern in Canada. The penalty for prepayment in excess of the
stipulated limit can be fairly severe. According to Lascelles (2010) the prepayment penalty amounts to the
greater of three months of interest or the interest rate diﬀerential (IRD) between the locked-in rate and
the market rate times the number of remaining years. This eﬀectively neutralizes any ﬁnancial incentive to
renegotiate in quest of a lower borrowing rate as the cost precisely oﬀsets the advantage. However, up until
1999 CMHC policy stipulated that for the remaining two years of a ﬁve-year term, the penalty should be just
8This risk is greater when borrowers face higher interest rates and for those that are (for
given levels of debt) less leveraged and/or wealthier. The direct costs are related to the
maturity-matched bond rate and the risk associated with default. Since we are looking only
at insured mortgages the cost to banks in the case of default are mostly just transaction
costs. Nonetheless, this risk is clearly greater for borrowers that are more leveraged and
with poorer credit history, and so we would expect lenders to view these borrower-types as
being less proﬁtable.
Contract proﬁtability also depends on the potential for borrowers to make complemen-
tary purchases at the same ﬁnancial institution where they hold their mortgage, such as
saving/deposit accounts, other loans, credit cards, and investment products. The size of a
borrower’s down-payments, for example, may inﬂuence how likely (s)he is to want, or be
able to, borrow from the same institution in the near term for other durables.
Finally, proﬁtability is aﬀected by the potential for borrowers to renew their mortgage
with the same ﬁnancial institution at the end of the contract term. Financial institutions
may have an incentive to lock-in borrowers since few negotiate the renewal of their mortgage.9
This tendency provides lenders with an incentive to attract consumers with larger loans who
have large outstanding balances at the time of renewal. Similarly, younger consumers and
ﬁrst-time home buyers are likely to be more proﬁtable in the long-term for lenders.
2.4.1 Negotiation on elements other than discounts
We assume throughout that borrowers can negotiate only on rates. It is possible that in
some cases borrowers and lenders negotiate on elements of the mortgage contract other than
the three months of interest. This rule has since been eliminated, but some lenders may still abide by it. It
remains the case that for any mortgage term of greater than ﬁve years, the penalty for prepayment after the
ﬁrst ﬁve years cannot exceed three months of interest. Consistent with this, it appears that Canadians take
advantage of their prepayment option much less than in the U.S. For instance, whereas Canadian borrowers
can prepay up to 15-20 per cent of their mortgage each year without penalty, the average prepayment is less
than 1 per cent (Lascelles 2010).
9CAAMP conducts annual surveys on the Canadian mortgage market and systematically ﬁnds that
borrowers overwhelmingly (over 85 per cent) renew their mortgage with their existing ﬁnancial institution.
9rates. In Canada there are a number of closing fees, some of which might be negotiable, and
others which are clearly not negotiable (at least with the lender). For example, a lender may
require a property assessment before lending funds to buy the home. Typically the assessor
is recommended by the real estate agent, and the cost ranges from 250 to 350 dollars. The
appraisal could be waived by the lender, and is typically done so unless the purchasing price
of the home is substantially greater than the market value. Anecdotal evidence suggests
this fee is only rarely negotiable. CMHC and Genworth also used to charge an underwriting
fee for mortgage insurance, and this could potentially be waved by the lender. The fee
was between 75 and 165 dollars (these fees were dropped in 2006). Fees that are typically
not negotiated between the lender and borrower include the home inspection fee (which the
lender does not require), land registration fees (which are paid to the municipality) property
taxes and insurance, and legal fees (paid to a notary or lawyer). Note that for property
insurance the lender could oﬀer a preferable rate (which we do not see in the data) rather
than a discount on the mortgage price. This is rather unlikely as Canadian banks are not
permitted to sell insurance inside their branch. There is also some evidence that lenders
will in rare instances negotiate on the fraction of the contract that can be prepaid without
penalty.
3 Data
3.1 Sources and sample selection
Our data come primarily from two sources. The ﬁrst is the CMHC administrative mortgage
database known as Emili. The CMHC is a crown corporation whose main purpose is to help
Canadians aﬀord housing by selling mortgage insurance. The CMHC has provided us with
10a subset of its proprietary data on the insured covering the period 1992 to 2004.10 In total
we have access to 20 household/mortgage characteristics, listed in the Appendix (Table 2).
Mortgage contracts were randomly sampled by Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). A CMA
is comprised of a large urban center and surrounding urban and rural fringes. However, as
our geographic identiﬁer, we use the forward sortation area which is a ﬁner measure than the
CMA.11 While the average forward sortation area has a radius of 7.6 kilometers, the median
is much lower at 2.6 kilometers.
The second major data source is provided by Genworth Financial Canada. Genworth is
similar to the CMHC in that it oﬀers mortgage insurance to Canadians and collects data
on borrowers to manage its portfolio. Together there are over 660,000 individual mortgage
contracts. However, there are a number of diﬀerences between the CMHC and Genworth
data that are worth mentioning. First, the CMHC sample starts in 1992 and Genworth
starts in 1996. Second, Genworth provided us with nearly their entire insurance portfolio and
therefore geographic sampling (in this case) was not an issue. Third, the CMHC data include
a number of categories not collected by Genworth. This includes a duration variable, where
the lender notes the length of time the borrower has been in a relationship with the lender.
Fourth, CMHC collects information on the residential status of the borrower. Borrowers are
either home-owners, live with parents, or are renters. CMHC also collects information on
lender-borrower relationships. That is, at the time of the mortgage application we know
whether the borrower is a new client or has a prior history (for other products) with the
10Breslaw, Irvine, and Rahman (1996) have previously used this data to study mortgage term and amor-
tization choice between 1980-1988.
11The forward sortation area is the ﬁrst half of a postal code. The ﬁrst letter gives the major geographic
region (18 major regions in Canada). The second character is a number between 0 and 9, where 0 means a
rural postal code and a number between 1 and 9 is an urban postal code. The last character gives the exact
area of a city or town in an urban area. For rural areas the third character does not give this information.
Some of the rural areas are very large, and we therefore drop them from our analysis. There are over 1,300
forward sortation areas in Canada. The postal code adds three characters to the forward sortation area.
The postal code can deﬁne a speciﬁc address or range of addresses in a town or neighborhood. There are
over 850,000 postal codes in Canada.
11lender.
Both CMHC and Genworth only began collecting household-level information such as
residential status and use of broker starting in 1998. This is also the case for the lender-
borrower relationship variable. In much of our empirical analysis we therefore focus on the
1999-2004 period.
Table 3 provides the yearly sample size, a provincial break-down, and a break-down
of mortgages by originator type. Since CMHC and Genworth Financial provided us with
diﬀerent sample sizes, we randomly select Genworth Financial contracts to match their
market share. From Table 3 we see that the majority of mortgage contracts are signed in the
provinces of Ontario and Qu´ ebec and largely match population patterns. For conﬁdentiality
reasons we do not present summary statistics by institution.
We also have information on the posted mortgage rates for most of the banks. These data
were collected every Wednesday from the Globe & Mail newspaper archives. Unfortunately
these archives do not list information on posted rates for some of the smaller institutions.
For this reason, despite the fact that we are interested in studying discounts, most of our
analysis will actually focus on margins. More speciﬁcally we focus on the transaction rate
minus a swap-adjusted bond rate. We can construct this measure regardless of which ﬁnancial
institution holds the mortgage contract.
Finally, we also have information on the number of branches of each ﬁnancial institution
in each market for 1998-2004 which we use to construct concentration measures in local
markets. For more details on branch locations see Allen, Clark, and Houde (2008).
3.2 Market trends: The rise of discounting
Discounting has not always been the norm in Canada. Until the mid 1990s very few Cana-
dians received any discount on their mortgage.12 Figure 1 characterizes the evolution of
12This was also true in the US. See for instance Duca and Rosthenal (1994) and Edelberg (2006).
12discounting for the most popular Canadian mortgage product – the 5-year ﬁxed rate mort-
gage. The ﬁgure illustrates how discounting has increased by about 100 basis points over
the 12 years from 1992 to 2004. However, the mark-up in the posted price has also increased
over time by about the same amount and so, as can be seen in the ﬁgure, the average margin
– the diﬀerence between the average transaction rate and the bond rate (which proxies the
cost of funding) – remained fairly constant over the period.
In other words, the average borrower is as well oﬀ in 2004 as in the early 1990’s. However,
these trends hide the fact that not all borrower-types experience gains. This can be seen in
Figure 2 which presents two histograms: one of discounts from 1992-1995 and the other of
discounts from 2000- July 2002.13 In the earlier period there is little dispersion and the vast
majority of households received either no discount or a small discount.14 Towards the latter
part of our sample only a small fraction of borrowers do not receiving any discount, many
receive large discounts, and there is considerable variance in the discounts received.
Figure 3 conﬁrms the increase in dispersion over time. It presents a whisker plot illus-
trating the dispersion in transaction rates for 5 year ﬁxed rate mortgages. Since there is a
substantial amount of price dispersion coming from week-to-week changes in posted rates,
we subtract from the transaction rate the within-week median rate. The ﬁgure reveals that
rate dispersion is increasing over time.
These trends coincide with a number of important changes to the market structure of
13TD-Canada Trust adopted a no-haggle policy in November 2002 which has a large eﬀect on discounts,
therefore we cut oﬀ the sample a few months before that.
14In Figure 2 some of the discounts are negative, which should never be the case. Lenders can oﬀer
borrowers a discount on the posted price, but are not allowed to oﬀer a loan to a high-risk borrower for a
premium. In the U.S., for example these premiums are called “overage” and there is evidence that they are
more likely to be charged to minorities, e.g. Courchane and Nicerkson (1997) The negative discounts that
we observe in the data come about because of how the data are administered and how rates are negotiated.
Typically, a borrower will negotiate a rate several weeks prior to the purchase of the home, and this rate can
be adjusted (downwards) until the purchase date. We observe posted rates weekly, and match the transaction
rate with the posted rate for the week closest to the day the home is purchased, and not the posted rate on
the day that the transaction rate is negotiated. Therefore if the posted rate falls and the borrower does not
renegotiate, the discount could be counted as negative.
13the Canadian banking industry. Following the regulatory changes of the early 1990’s, the
Canadian banking industry underwent a major merger and acquisition wave, with the major
banks acquiring almost all of the trust companies over the following decade. The result
was a concentrated mortgage market in which a small number of large national ﬁnancial
institutions dominated the market.
Historically, the trusts oﬀered lower rates and captured a large fraction of those bor-
rowers that shopped for the best rate. Having swallowed up the trust companies, the large
ﬁnancial institutions began competing heavily amongst themselves for these borrowers. At
the same time the Canadian market opened its doors to virtual and brick-and-mortar foreign
competition in the mid 1990’s. As part of their entry strategy some foreign competitors used
diﬀerent pricing schemes than the primary lenders. Unlike the primary Canadian lenders,
ING Canada, for example, entered with low no-haggle rates. The result was that the large
ﬁnancial institutions moved to a strategy in which they established higher posted rates and
then negotiated individual-speciﬁc discounts rather than lowering posted prices for everyone.
Therefore, while the average borrower is as well oﬀ under this new strategy, some types of
borrowers experience gains, while others are worse oﬀ. Using this strategy the large ﬁnancial
institutions were able to maintain (or even grow) their market share.15
The fact that when faced with the threat of entry by foreign and virtual banks the
incumbent banks moved from something closer to a single-price strategy where everyone pays
the posted prices, to a strategy where they post a higher price but selectively oﬀer discounts
is consistent with existing models of strategic entry deterrence and price discrimination.
Armstrong and Vickers (1993) show theoretically that when ﬁrms can set diﬀerent prices
for more and less captive customer segments they are more likely to deter entry of new
15There exists an extensive literature, starting with Riley and Zeckhauser (1983), that compares the
proﬁtability of posted-price and haggling pricing strategies. In a laboratory setting Cason, Friedman, and
Milam (2003) ﬁnd that markups (and proﬁts) are signiﬁcantly higher in haggle environments than posted
price environments.
14competitors into the less captive customer segments.16
Also in the mid 1990’s, the role of mortgage brokers as ﬁnancial intermediaries began to
grow in Canada. Figure 4 presents the share of transactions that were broker-assisted in our
sample. The share increased from less than 10 per cent to over 30 per cent in 7 years.17 A
large number of consumers, therefore, choose to elicit the help of a broker when shopping for
a mortgage. Of course, the direction of causality is not at all clear. The use of brokers may
have increased due to the fact that banks began oﬀering discounts, but they may have also
contributed to this increase in discounting. In Section 4 we show that, on average, borrowers
that use a broker pay less on their mortgage than borrowers who do not.
As far as we are aware, during our sample period all lenders except the largest in the
country, RBC, process broker-business.18 Rather than use mortgage brokers RBC relies
more heavily on in-house mortgage specialists (most ﬁnancial institutions have mortgage
specialists in addition to using brokers). These are broker-like individuals that only work
for one lender. They will visit a potential borrower at their home or place of business, like
a broker, but unlike a broker, they only sell their lender’s product.
Finally, there were important technological changes occurring during this time in the
Canadian mortgage market.19 The 1990’s saw the advent of LAN and the internet making
it easier for staﬀ at ﬁnancial institutions to handle larger volumes of applications. More
importantly the underwriting processes of ﬁnancial institutions became automated during
this time period making it much easier to work through the loan approval process. Since we
are dealing only with insured mortgages, it should also be noted that in 1996 the CMHC
introduced an automated approval system which dramatically increased the speed of its
16For more detailed discussions see Stole (2007) and Armstrong (2008).
17This is still substantially less than in the United States where pre-crisis brokers originate 68 per cent of
mortgages. In 2009 the share of mortgages originated by brokers in the U.S. was less than 15 per cent.
18In 2006 BMO stopped using independent brokers, following RBC’s example.
19Similar changes occurred around the same time in the US. Underwriting systems were developed and
data storage costs decreased, and so risk-based pricing grew in importance. See for instance Edelberg (2006).
15mortgage approval process. Prior to this the banks faxed the information to the CMHC for
approval. The new automated system standardized the national credit approval system and
reduced the number of errors in client proﬁles at the CMHC. All of these changes may have
made it easier for lenders to oﬀer diﬀerent rates to diﬀerent borrowers as a function of their
measurable characteristics.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In the following sections we focus on the period 1999-2004 since, as explained above, a
number of variables that are key in determining discounting are missing or less accurate
prior to 1999.
3.3.1 Household characteristics and mortgage contracts
We ﬁrst present summary descriptions of discrete variables in Table 4. We focus on new home
purchases so we exclude home-owners that are either reﬁnancing or renewing their mortgage
contract. Over 25 per cent of the borrowers in our sample owned a home at the time of the
contract. These previous owners are obtaining a mortgage for a new property, but still do
not have enough equity in the home to avoid paying insurance (they are upgrading). The
remaining new home owners are exiting from renting or living with their parents. Consistent
with Figure 4 we ﬁnd that by the late 1990’s the market share of brokers had reaching nearly
30 per cent. We also ﬁnd that the majority of Canadians are buying detached homes. Lastly,
the majority of mortgage contracts are for ﬁxed periods; only a small number of households
sign variable-rate mortgages.
Summary descriptions of continuous variables are presented in Table 5. We present the
mean, standard deviation, and yearly trend for (i) the full sample, (ii) a sub-sample of
previous home-owners, and (iii) a sub-sample of new home-owners. The purpose of splitting
the sample in this way is to explore the possibility that more experienced home-buyers have
16a diﬀerent mortgage shopping experience than ﬁrst-time home-buyers.
For the full sample the mean borrower has been with his/her ﬁnancial institution 53
months before the contract is signed, about 8 months more than the mean for new home-
owners and 20 months less than the mean for previous home-owners. The trend has been
towards shorter relationships over time, with more people are signing mortgage contracts
with an institution that is not their primary ﬁnancial institution at the time the mortgage
is signed.
Table 5 also presents information on loan size and house prices, and also on loan-to-value
ratios (LTVs). The mean loan is about 145,000 dollars to purchase a 161,000 dollars home
(all in 2002 dollars). Previous home-owners buy more expensive homes than do new home-
owners, and they also borrow more. The mean loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is around 90 for
all samples.
The LTV is worth examining is more detail. The LTV constraint is set by the federal
government and aﬀects a borrower’s loan size choice. This ratio is used by governments to
either spur or slow-down housing investment.20 It is therefore an important policy variable
that aﬀects a consumer’s budget constraint. Figure 5 plots LTV ratios. LTV ratios are
highly localized around 90 and 95, and to a lesser extent 75, 80, and 85. The clustering
comes about because the pricing schedule is discrete and there are only a small number of
price-quantity pairs. Consumers therefore choose the LTV bucket that maximizes the loan
but where they can still aﬀord the monthly mortgage payments, including the insurance
premium.
The mean household income is almost 70,000 dollars and the total debt service ratio
(TDS) is 32. A TDS of 31.9 is relative low compared to the guideline maximum of 40.
20Most recently (2010) the Canadian government changed the maximum LTV for reﬁnancing from 95 to
90. Changes to the LTV for new purchases have previously been made in 1982 and 1992, both recessions.
In 1982 the maximum LTV was reduced from 95 to 90 and in 1992 the maximum LTV was increased from
90 to 95.)
17Figure 5 presents a histogram of borrowers’ total debt service ratios. The graph is right-
censored at 50, with all ratios greater than 50 accumulated at 50. There do not appear to be
diﬀerences in the distribution of TDS ratios across samples. The 40 per cent TDS guideline is
largely followed, with very few households borrowing with a TDS greater than the guideline
maximum. Given the heavy right-skewness of the distribution, however, the constraint does
appear to be binding for a large number of households. Previous home-owners and ﬁrst-time
home-owners have similar TDS ratios.
The typical mortgage term is 60 months; mortgages of this type represent over 70 per cent
of the sample. The second most common term is 36 months, with 13 per cent of the sample.
The standard amortization period on these term-mortgages is 300 months, with nearly all
Canadians choosing this amortization period. We also present the mean transaction price
and posted price, normalized by the swap-adjusted bond rates that match the term.21 We
discuss rates in more detail in the following subsections.
Discounting is prevalent in the Canadian mortgage market. Table 5 presents the sample
means and standard deviations for both the transaction price less the adjusted bond rate and
the posted price less the adjusted bond rate for 3 and 5 year ﬁxed mortgages from 1999-2004.
For each term, the diﬀerence between the two is the mean discount. Over the full sample,
the mean discount for the 3 year mortgage is 48 basis points and the mean discount for the
5 year mortgage is 97 basis points. These represent average discounts of 9.2 and 19.2 per
cent for the 3-year and 5-year mortgages, respectively.
21Banks use swaps to hedge the fact that they hold short-term liabilities (deposits) and long-term assets
(mortgages). As the swap market developed, bond rates (including mortgage rates), became more closely
linked to banks’ funding costs at long maturities (Allen and McVanel (2009)).
184 Empirical analysis
We have shown above that rates are dispersed. This is despite the fact that the loans we
study are all fully insured and so the role of risk is much less important than standard credit
markets. The purpose of this section is to determine what factors explain the remaining
variation. We decompose discounts, focusing on factors related to (i) the proﬁtability of
each contract to the lender (in terms of prepayment and complementary services, and future
renegotiation value) and to (ii) heterogeneity in consumer preferences – in search costs, in
bargaining ability, and in willingness to pay for bank characteristics.
4.1 Explaining discounts
The focus of our analysis is on margins (transaction rates - adjusted bond rate) rather
than discounts because we do not have the posted rate for some of the smaller ﬁnancial
institutions. We further restrict attention to 5 year ﬁxed-rate mortgages amortized over 25
years, and to the 1999-2004 period.
We decompose margins into loan, bank, and consumer eﬀects. The ﬁrst set of estimation
results are presented in Table 6. All speciﬁcations include bank and week ﬁxed eﬀects.
Columns (2)-(4) also include FSA (neighborhood) ﬁxed eﬀects. In Column (5) we replace the
FSA ﬁxed eﬀects with about 25 FSA-level 2001 census variables such as rental and housing
costs, income, age, etc. Focusing ﬁrst on household income we see from columns (1) and
(2) that richer households appear to pay lower mortgage rates. However, looking at column
(2) we can see that some of this is due to unobserved neighborhood eﬀects correlated with
income. Furthermore, when conditioning on loan size the story is diﬀerent; richer households
in fact pay higher rates than poorer households (column (3)). The more expensive the home,
however, the larger is the discount.
Table 6 also shows that the most ﬁnancially constrained households (those with an LTV
19of 95, i.e. 1(Min. down)) pay higher rates than other borrowers – about 12 basis points
more than the base-ratio of LTVs less than 0.85. 1(Min. down)) isolates the eﬀect of down
payment on rates since we control for house prices. Our results suggest that lenders charge
a premium for such a high leverage ratio. The more borrowers put down (relative to the
baseline), the smaller the premium they are charged. Borrowers in the 0.9-0.95 range pay
a premium of about 4 basis points, while borrowers in the 0.85-0.9 range pay a premium of
about 1.2 basis points.
Related to our discussion in Section 2.4, these results point to the possibility that diﬀerent
shopping/search incentives arise depending on the ﬁnancial characteristics of the household,
size of the loan, and, by extension, house price. Richer households may have larger search
costs and so may spend less time shopping for and negotiating their mortgage. Likewise
the incentive to search for and negotiate better rates is likely decreasing in the size of the
down-payment. The fact that borrowers with diﬀerent LTV’s pay diﬀerent rates is also
consistent with the fact that ﬁnancial institutions are concerned with the future proﬁtability
of borrowers.
Finally, comparing columns (4) and (5) we see that the FSA ﬁxed eﬀects explain more of
the variance in the rates than the FSA-level control variables, but not by a large amount. We
use speciﬁcation (5) throughout the rest paper because (i) in our analysis of the mortgage
broker decision in Section 4.1.1 the data are at the FSA level and we cannot use FSA ﬁxed
eﬀects and (ii) the speciﬁcation with FSA ﬁxed eﬀects is diﬃcult to solve when estimating
the the diﬀerent quantiles in Section 4.2.
In Table 7 we display estimates for market and household characteristics, as well as the
loan characteristics from Table 6. All speciﬁcations include week and bank ﬁxed eﬀects,
along with the FSA-level census variables. Column (1) uses all of the contracts from 1999
to 2004 while columns (2)-(5) restrict to various subsamples. In column (2) we drop the
period from November 2002 to August 2004. TD-Canada Trust was experimenting with a
20no haggle policy during this period, which could have an eﬀect on our estimates. In column
(3) we restrict attention to contracts signed with the Big 8 ﬁnancial institutions, while in
columns (4) and (5) we compare new owners to previous owners.
We consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of market structure on margins. We ﬁnd that more branch-
concentrated neighborhoods (HHI) on average experience higher rates. Share branches is
a borrower-speciﬁc variable and is calculated as the fraction of branches in a neighborhood
owned by the borrower’s lender. We conclude that the larger a bank’s market share, the
higher are the rates that it can charge to borrowers.
Turning to household characteristics we study the eﬀect of borrower credit scores on rates.
The literature on ‘risk-based pricing’ suggests that interest rate dispersion in many credit
markets can largely be explained by heterogeneity in borrower risk levels and the ability of
ﬁnancial institutions to discriminate between borrowers according to these diﬀerences. We
also ﬁnd that borrower risk inﬂuences rates. In our data, FICO is a categorical variable with
four risk categories. The highest risk category represents the most creditworthy borrowers
according to the Fair Isaac Corporation. The omitted category, risk0 represents borrowers
that are the least credit worthy. Our results suggest that borrowers with better credit scores
receive larger discounts. In normal credit markets this result would be intuitive: riskier
consumers pay higher rates (for example see Demyanyk and Hemert (2009) for mortgage
rate spreads between prime and subprime borrowers in the U.S.). However, our sample of
mortgages are all insured, and so in case of borrower default the lender can transfer title of
the home to the insurer and request payment from it (the insurer must then sell the home).
Therefore, at ﬁrst glance the positive relationship between FICO scores and discounts might
seem surprising. We believe that the main explanation for the positive eﬀect of a good
credit score on rates is rooted in the long-term value of borrowers to ﬁnancial institutions.
As discussed in Appendix A, Canadians do most of their banking at a single institution.
Lenders should therefore be interested in the quality of borrowers since they may represent
21diﬀerent proﬁt opportunities for cross-product selling. Good credit scores are correlated
with unobserved characteristics of borrowers that are valued by lenders. Lenders appear
to take good credit scores as a signal that a consumer is proﬁtable, that is, high credit
score consumers are more likely to buy multiple products from a bank than low credit score
consumers. Financial institutions therefore oﬀer better rates to high credit score consumers
in order to lock them in and then sell other products, such as credit cards and savings
instruments.
As discussed above, it is also the case that despite the fact that the insurance company
covers the expenses of the lender in case of default, there is still a cost to the lenders in
dealing with defaulting borrowers and low credit score borrowers are more likely to default.
Furthermore, the insurers pressure the ﬁnancial institutions to use the same standards in
evaluating mortgage contracts that will ultimately be insured and those that will not. In
other words, the ﬁnancial institutions cannot appear to be applying lower standards on
mortgage contracts that they expect will be insured.
In the full speciﬁcation Renters, Parents, and Switchers all receive lower rates. The
base category for Renters and Parents is previous home-owner. Borrowers in the base
category are likely older than in the other two categories. Our results suggest, therefore,
that ﬁrst-time buyers receive discounts relative to previous owners. This is consistent with
Goldberg (1996) who, in the context of the car market, ﬁnds that households under the
age of 30 who have not previously purchased a car receive discounts relative to experienced
buyers. As in Goldberg (1996) we suspect that ﬁrst-time buyers are more price elastic and
lenders are more willing to oﬀer discounts to younger borrowers in return for future expected
proﬁts.
The Switcher variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower signs a mortgage
with a ﬁnancial institution that is not their main ﬁnancial institution at the time of the
mortgage origination. The lender is therefore attracting a new client. Our estimates suggest
22that new clients receive larger discounts than existing clients, on the order of 10 basis points
over the full sample. This is consistent with the extensive literature on consumer switching
costs giving ﬁrms market power over loyal consumers (e.g. see Klemperer (1995)).
Over the full sample the average impact of a mortgage broker is to reduce rates by 17.5
basis points. Brokers are a signiﬁcant factor, therefore, in driving discounts. This result is in
sharp contrast to the mutual fund industry, for example, where Bergstresser, Chalmers, and
Tufano (2009) ﬁnd that on a risk-adjusted basis brokers actually delivered lower returns to
consumers than direct channels between 1996-2004 in the U.S. It also appears to be in sharp
contrast to the U.S. mortgage-broker experience where due to the lack of ﬁduciary duties
mortgage brokers led borrowers to sign unfavorable contracts (Hall and Woodward (2010)
or Berndt, Holliﬁeld, and Sand˚ as (2010)). It should be pointed out that in our estimation
there might be unobserved borrower characteristics that aﬀect both the decision to shop
with a broker and outcomes. We examine this in more detail in the next section. Related
to the broker result is the mortgage specialist result. Mortgage specialists oﬀer convenience
to consumers, although they do not reduce search costs. This is because they work for one
lender only. What specialists do, however, is oﬀer ﬂexible hours that branch managers do
not oﬀer, and will go to a borrowers home, for example, to sign a contract. Borrowers who
use a specialist pay on average 3-4 basis points for this convenience.
Columns (2)-(5) provide more disaggregated information. The results in column (2) are
almost identical to those in (3) suggesting that the no-haggle policy of TD Canada Trust had
little overall impact on the factors inﬂuencing discounting. Column (3) focuses on borrowers
who sign mortgages at one of the 8 largest mortgage providers (Big 8) in Canada. The key
diﬀerence between columns (3) and (1) is with the Switcher variable. The result suggests
that borrowers who are new clients at one of the Big 8 banks receive less of a discount than
borrowers who are new clients elsewhere. This result is consistent with the earlier result
that banks with larger local branch networks oﬀer smaller discounts. This second result,
23however, suggests that in addition to competitive price factors (Share branch), lenders with
larger branch networks also have a competitive quality factor. That is, consumers appear
willing to sign a mortgage contract with a large Big 8 bank at a worse rate than they could
receive elsewhere. One reason could be that borrowers value the other services provided by
the lender and the lender takes this into account when pricing the mortgage.22 Evidence
in Appendix A suggests that the majority of Canadians do their banking at one ﬁnancial
institution, therefore it seems likely that consumers take into account the quality of the
lender as a whole, not only as a mortgage-provider. The other diﬀerence is with respect to
the LTV. The premium received by borrowers for larger downpayments is larger at Big 8
banks.
Columns (4) and (5) separate out contracts for new and previous home-owners. In
some cases there are only small diﬀerences between the two groups of home-buyers, but in
others it is substantial. For example, only the most ﬁnancially constrained previous home-
owners pay a premium, and it is one-third the size of the premium of the most ﬁnancially
constrained new home-owners. Another interesting diﬀerence shows up with Switcher. We
ﬁnd that previous home-owners that switch ﬁnancial institutions receive a larger discount
than new home-buyers. This should not be surprising. Previous home owners are also more
experienced in mortgage contracting. Switcher is a proxy for consumers who reject the initial
oﬀer from their home bank. Conditional on searching, more experienced negotiators receive
better rates.
22In a diﬀerent market Verboven (2002) ﬁnds that the same ﬁrm selling the same car but with two engine
options – diesel or gasoline – charges a 70-90 per cent mark-up on the diesel engine above the cost diﬀerence
because of consumer’s willingness to pay for quality. In a case study of S&P index funds Horta¸ csu and
Syverson (2004) show that some ﬁrms can charge more for what appear to be nearly identical goods because,
in addition to search costs, investor’s perceive quality diﬀerences based on such things as whether the fund
is exchange-traded and the number of funds under management, for example.
244.1.1 Mortgage Brokers
In Table 7 we show that the impact of a broker ranges from a discount of 17.4 basis points to
19.3 basis points, depending on the sample. However broker choice is not exogenous. There
might be unobserved borrower characteristics that aﬀect both the decision to shop with a
broker and outcomes. For instance, ﬁnancially literate borrowers are likely to get better rate
quotes regardless of whether they use a broker or not. If these borrowers are also more prone
to shop with a broker, this may inﬂate the coeﬃcient on the broker variable. In Table 8 we
present estimates from same speciﬁcations as in Table 7 but using a two-stage treatments
eﬀects model. The ﬁrst-stage is a probit regression using all of the regressors from Table 7
and an additional regressor which gives us an exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction
we use is the share of mortgage brokers in a market (5KM around the centroid of the FSA) in
2009. Broker presence should be strongly correlated with broker choice and only indirectly
aﬀect interest rates. Ideally we would want to use the share of mortgage brokers in the years
for which the contracts were signed. Unfortunately we do not have broker location data
prior to 2009. There is some indirect evidence, however, that the market has been relatively
stable since about 2001. (See Figure 4 for the share of transactions that were broker assisted
between 1997 to 2004. In addition market share data from the mortgage industry for 2005-
present suggest that the share of broker-assisted transactions has remained constant since
2004.)
We present results for three speciﬁcations, the full sample and two subsamples – new
home-owners and previous home-owners. In all instances we ﬁnd that the more concentrated
the broker market (Broker share) the less likely a borrower is to use a broker. In other words,
borrowers are more likely to use brokers in markets where there is more broker competition.
This is also the case with lender competition (HHI). Borrowers are more likely to use a
broker when there are many lenders. When there are many lenders the returns to hiring a
broker are potentially higher since they have access to more options. In addition we ﬁnd
25that poorer households and those more ﬁnancially constrained are more likely to use a broker
than rich and ﬁnancially unconstrained households. Poorer or more ﬁnancially constrained
borrowers may recognize that they will be at a disadvantage when bargaining over rates with
ﬁnancial institutions. This ﬁnding can be related to the eﬀect Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer,
and Silva-Risso (2003) ﬁnd of being a minority on prices for cars purchased via the internet.
In their context, minorities buying cars on the internet do not face the same level of price
discrimination as minorities buying cars at dealers. In our context, poorer borrowers may
face greater levels of price discrimination when bargaining in person at the branch than they
do when transacting through a broker, resulting in an increased propensity on the part of
poorer borrowers to select brokers.
Turning to the second stage regression we can see that controlling for the endogeneity of
broker usage has little eﬀect on the other control variables. The only other coeﬃcients that
are aﬀected when we control for the endogeneity of broker choice are those on the share of
branches in 5KM and on switchers. In both the cases their eﬀects are dampened once we
control for endogeneity of broker choice.
The main eﬀect is on the broker coeﬃcient. Controlling for endogeneity the coeﬃcient
on broker nearly doubles, so that borrowers using a broker get a discount of approximately
32 basis points in the full sample. This follows from the ﬁrst stage regression, which show
that the borrowers using a broker are the poorest and most ﬁnancially constrained.
4.2 Quantile Regressions
We next examine results from quantile regressions of margins on loan, market, and house-
hold characteristics, controlling for week, bank, and province ﬁxed eﬀects as well as census
variables. The sample period is 1999-2004. We are interested in determining the eﬀects
of the covariates on margins for diﬀerent quantiles of the conditional margin distribution.
Estimates are presented graphically in Figure 6.
26In each picture, the X-axis indicates the quantile of the distribution of margins conditional
on the particular covariate. The quantiles of the margin distribution capture the distribution
the outcome if the negotiation. Low quantiles represent borrowers who received a relatively
big discount given their value of the covariate, while high quantiles are borrowers paying
high rates relative to their value (that is, they are receiving almost no discount).
We are conditioning on a very rich set of ﬁnancial characteristics that aﬀect the prof-
itability of the transaction. Therefore, what is left reﬂects mostly borrower heterogeneity,
and so it makes sense to think of this distribution as stemming from consumers’ unobserved
search/negotiation ability: low quantiles are consumers with low search costs who are able
to gather quotes from multiple lenders or with good negotiation skills, while higher quantiles
are consumers with larger search costs.
For the majority of covariates the marginal eﬀects are heterogeneous across the distri-
bution of rates. The exceptions are two-thirds of the LTV variables, Renter and to some
extent Parents. The latter two are our two proxies for age and there appears to be a constant
marginal eﬀect of both characteristics along the distribution of rates.
For the other household characteristics that we examine (broker, FICO score and switcher),
a consistent U-shaped pattern emerges.23 The proﬁles of the marginal eﬀects of the market
characteristics as well as the marginal eﬀects for house prices and other debt are the opposite
of the household characteristics but have the same interpretation because the signs of the
coeﬃcients are the opposite. In each case the marginal eﬀects are zero or close to zero in
the tails of the conditional distribution. The marginal eﬀect of the household characteristics
on margins is decreasing (increasing for the market, house price and other debt variables)
until we reach the highest quantiles, at which point it begins to increase (decrease for the
market, house price and other debt variables). In other words the marginal eﬀect of using
23Unlike in the linear model, however, we do not control for the endogeniety of broker choice in the quantile
regressions.
27a broker, or of having a better FICO score, or of being a new consumer (Switcher) on dis-
counts is increasing in transaction rate up until about the 80th percentile, at which point the
marginal eﬀect on discounts begins to decrease. At the lowest rates, therefore, the marginal
eﬀect of using a broker or having a good FICO score or being a new client does not lead to
a noticeable discount.
How do we explain this pattern? If the quantiles map into search propensity, then the
results suggest that consumers who search a lot get a rate close to marginal cost regardless
of their characteristic. Since the marginal eﬀects are all close to zero for those consumers
that engage in search, it is clear that they have extracted all of the rents. Irrespectively
of their characteristics or the characteristics of the local market, informed consumers will
always receive a good rate from the lender.
At the other end of the distribution the marginal eﬀect is also zero. Here the reason
is more mechanical. At this point in the distribution, the dispersion in rates should be
zero since there is a ceiling imposed on branch managers by the posted rate. Since the
posted price is independent of consumer characteristics, the marginal eﬀects should be zero
conditional on paying the posted price. (If the distribution were not truncated, there would
be no increase at this end of the distribution.)
For borrowers in between, those who do not search too much or have imperfect informa-
tion about lenders’ costs, the transaction rate is highly correlated with the characteristic.
In other words, the marginal eﬀect of the covariate on this part of the distribution is much
more important.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies prices in the Canadian mortgage market, in particular the prevalence of
discounting by the majority of lenders. We ﬁnd that discounting has increased over time
28and that there is considerable dispersion in discounts. Since the contracts we study are all
insured, we look for factors other than risk to explain this dispersion. The extent to which
consumers receive discounts depends on a variety of household, contractual, and market-
structure characteristics.
The main results of the paper are the following. First, without conditioning on loan
characteristics we ﬁnd that higher income households pay less for their mortgage than lower
income households. However, once we condition on loan size and house price we ﬁnd that
richer households actually pay the highest rates. Second, ﬁnancially constrained households
pay higher rates (i.e. 1(Min.down) and low FICO score). Third, banks discriminate between
consumers based on loyalty, age, and valuation of network size. Fourth, borrowers that use
mortgage brokers pay lower rates, and rates negotiated through brokers are less responsive
to household characteristics. Fifth, rates are higher in more concentrated markets.
These results suggest that a number of factors are important in determining the prof-
itability of borrowers to lenders. These factors include (a) Complementary services: Sav-
ing/deposit, other loans, etc., (b) Lock-in incentive: Few consumers negotiate after 5 years.
Large incentive to attract consumers buying expensive homes, and (c) Prepayment: Despite
penalties, richer households are more likely to repay their mortgage early. The results also
suggest that borrowers have important shopping and search incentives. The incentive to
search depends on (a) the value of time (richer households have larger search costs), and (b)
diﬀerentiation (loyal consumers pay more).
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32Appendix A
The evolution of the banking system has led Canadian households to treat their primary bank
as a “one-stop shop” (universal bank) where they purchase the majority of their ﬁnancial
services. From Table 1 we see that 67 per cent of Canadian households have their mortgage
at the same ﬁnancial institution as their main checking account. In addition, 55 per cent
of household loans, 78 per cent of credit cards, 73 per cent of term deposits, 45 per cent of
bonds/guaranteed investments and 39 per cent of mutual funds are held at the same ﬁnancial
institution as the households main checking account. Financial institutions, therefore, are
very successful, once they attract a client, in selling multiple products to that client.
Table 1: Banking Habits of Canadians: 1999-2006
We report summary statistics on bank account(s) usage using data from an annual survey conducted by Ipsos-
Reid called the Canadian Financial Monitor. The survey consists of approximately 12,000 households per
year. Allen, Clark, and Houde (2008) use this survey to analyze the diﬀusion of electronic banking in Canada
between 1998-2006. We deﬁne a household’s main ﬁnancial institution as the institution corresponding to
the most active checking account.
Account Main FI Second FI All other FI
Mortgage (all) 67.4% 10.9% 21.7%a
Mortgage (no broker) 70.3% 10.8% 18.9%
Mortgage (broker) 37.3% 30.6% 32.1%
Loan 55.8% 9.6% 34.6%
Credit cardb 77.9% 20.7% 1.4%
GIC or term deposit 72.8% 15.8% 11.4%
Bonds, t-bills, other guaranteed invest’s 45.3% 7.8% 46.9%
Mutual fundsc 38.8% 7.2% 54.0%
a: The majority of the time the reason a mortgage is classiﬁed as “other” is that
the household has written down the lender as category “any bank” or “any credit
union”, which does not match with the more speciﬁc name the respondent provided
when responding to the question about their main ﬁnancial institution. The credit
card category excludes retail cards. b: The average household has 2.5 cards although
half of these are retail cards, which can only be used at the retail outlet that issued
the card. GIC is an acronym for Government Investment Certiﬁcate. These are ﬁxed
term deposits, typically 1-3 years. c: Investor Group Inc. has the largest market
share of the mutual fund industry in Canada and they are not a deposit-taking
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Figure 5: Loan to Value and Total Debt Service Ratios: 1999-2004
36Figure 6: Quantiles Estimates (1999-2004)
Dependent Variable: Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
The estimates are from a quantile regression of the transaction rate on loan, market, and households
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Table 2: Deﬁnition of Household / Mortgage Characteristics
Name Description
FI Type of lender
Source Identiﬁes how lender generated the loan (branch, online, broker, etc)
Income Total amount of the borrower(s) salary, wages, and income from other sources
TSD Ratio of total debt service to income
Duration Length of the relationship between the borrower and FI
R-status Borrowers residential status upon insurance application
FSA Forward sortation area of the mortgaged property
Market value Selling price or estimated market price if reﬁnancing
Applicant type Quartile of the borrowers risk of default
Dwelling type 10 options that deﬁne the physical structure
Close Closing date of purchase or date of reﬁnance
Loan amount Dollar amount of the loan excluding the loan insurance premium
Premium Loan insurance premium
Purpose Purpose of the loan (purchase, port, reﬁnance, etc.)
LTV Loan amount divided by lending value
Price Interest rate of the mortgage
Term Represents the term over which the interest rate applies to the loan
Amortization Represents the period the loan will be paid oﬀ
Interest type Fixed or adjustable rate
FICO Summarized application credit score (minimum borrower credit score).
Some variables were only included by one of the mortgage insurers.Table 3: Distributions of the CMHC and Genworth Samples
Date Frequency Province Percent Lender type Percent
1992 10,459 NL 0.96 Bank 74.00
1993 15,028 PEI 0.07 Credit Union 7.84
1994 14,728 NS 2.22 Trust/insurance co. 18.19
1995 16,319 NB 1.18
1996 21,808 QC 21.61
1997 28,366 ON 44.94
1998 29,080 MB 3.50
1999 32,433 SK 2.25
2000 30,689 AB 11.04




Table 4: Summary Description of Discrete Variables: 1999-2004
Variable Choice Percentage of Contracts
Sourcey branch 70.4%
broker 29.6%
Dwelling type detached 66.7%
semi-detached 11.1%
row or mobile 10.4%
apartment/condo 12.9%
Residential statusz own 27.6%
rent 64.0%
parents 8.5%
Interest type ﬁxed 92.4%
variable 7.6%Table 5: Summary Description of Continuous Variables: 1999-2004
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Yearly Trend
Borrower/lender relationshipz
full sample 52.6 mth 73.1 mths -0.1 mths
home-owners 73.3 mths 80.3 mths -0.5 mths
non-home-owners 44.6 mths 68.5 mths -0.3 mths
Loan amount
full sample $145,241 $64,312 $5,659
home-owners $157,713 $69,691 $7,356
non-home-owners $142,620 $63,991 $6,780
Buying price of house
full sample $161,256 $73,211 $6,237
home-owners $178,251 $80,352 $8,260
non-home-owners $157,178 $72,016 $7,336
LTV
full sample 90.6 5.2 0.01
home-owners 89.0 6.2 -0.03
non-home-owners 91.2 4.7 0.06
Household income
full sample $69,843 $32,145 $173
home-owners $80,065 $36,735 -$279
non-home-owners $66,400 $29,939 $322
TDS
Continued on next page...... table 5 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Yearly Trend
full sample 32.0 6.4 -0.01
home-owners 33.1 6.0 0.08
non-home-owners 32.5 6.0 0.04
Term
full sample 56.5 mths 17.5 mths -0.99 mths
home-owners 53.5 mths 18.4 mths -0.29 mths
non-home-owners 57.1 mths 17.4 mths -1.01 mths
Amortization
full sample 296.3 mths 18.4 mths 0.35 mths
home-owners 293.6 mths 22.3 mths 0.3 mths
non-home-owners 297.0 mths 17.4 mths 0.3 mths
Transaction price minus adjusted bond rate
year = 3




full sample 1.06% 0.84%
home-owners 0.97% 0.96%
non-home-owners 1.10% 0.82%
Posted price minus adjusted bond rate
year = 3
full sample 1.99% 0.33%
home-owners 1.97% 0.34%
Continued on next page...... table 5 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Yearly Trend
non-home-owners 1.98% 0.34%
year = 5









full sample 19.2% 22.9%
home-owners 24.5% 30.8%
non-home-owners 18.3% 21.8%
Notes: Nominal values are deﬂated using the consumer price index, base=2002. The home-owner
and non-home-owner categories are based on sub-samples from 1999-2004 using only CMHC data,
since CMHC is the only insurer to collect this information. The full sample is CMHC and Genworth
combined. Cost of funding is based on three and ﬁve year bond rates. z: the length of the
borrower/lender relationship at the time of the mortgage origination is only available from 1998
onward.Table 6: Regression Results with Contractual Variables (1999-2004)
Dependent Variable: Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
Income is monthly income in thousands of dollars. Other debt is the households monthly debt
obligations other than the mortgage. This includes payments on personal loans such as auto loans but
also property taxes and credit card limits. Also included in the regression are categorial variables for
the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), where the base-ratio is less than 0.85. The categories are based on Figure
5. 1(Min:down) is a dummy variable for borrowers with an LTV of 0.95, i.e. those making the smallest
down payment possible by law. House price is in hundreds of thousands of dollars, as is Loan amount.
All regressions include week and bank ﬁxed eﬀects.
VARIABLES Full Full Full Full Full
log(Income (X 1K)) -0.132y -0.0179y 0.118y 0.208y 0.216y
(0.00464) (0.00491) (0.00611) (0.00806) (0.00806)
log(Other debt (X 1K)) -0.0670y -0.0657y
(0.00350) (0.00349)
0:85  LTV < 90 0.0126** 0.0113*
(0.00599) (0.00599)




log(House price (X 100K)) -0.631y -0.277y -0.304y
(0.0400) (0.00761) (0.00736)
log(Loan (X 100K)) 0.358y
(0.0409)
Constant 1.534y 1.387y 1.271y 1.001y 1.069y
(0.0355) (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0378) (0.259)
OBS 105,338 105,338 105,338 105,338 105,315
R2 0.344 0.389 0.399 0.405 0.388
Robust standard errors in parentheses
y p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 7: Regression Results Including Observable Borrower/Lender Characteristics (1999-2004)
Dependent Variable: Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
HHI is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index of branches in a borrowers 5KM neighborhood. Share branches is the
fraction of branches owned by the lender in the borrowers 5KM neighborhood. Renter is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the borrower was a renter prior to applying for a mortgage. Parents is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the borrower was living with his/her parents prior to applying for a mortgage. Renters and Parents are
relative to previous owners. Switcher is a dummy variable indicating a borrower has signed a mortgage with
a ﬁnancial institution that is not their main ﬁnancial institution. broker is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
borrower used a broker to facilitate the mortgage transaction. specialist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
borrower used a mortgage specialist to facilitate the mortgage transaction. There are 4 credit categories, the
base is FICO0. The highest credit category represents the most creditworthy borrowers. Column (2) excludes
the Nov 2002-December 2004 period because TD Bank experimented with a no haggle pricing policy. Column
(3) includes borrowers only at the largest 8 ﬁnancial institutions. Column (4) are new home-owners and column
(5) are previous home-owners. Controls include FSA census variables in 2001.
VARIABLES Full Haggle Big 8 New owners Previous owners
log(House price (X 100K)) -0.290y -0.299y -0.295y -0.293y -0.270y
(0.00726) (0.00838) (0.00801) (0.00793) (0.0183)
log(Income (X 1K)) 0.197y 0.197y 0.190y 0.182y 0.200y
(0.00793) (0.00927) (0.00869) (0.00849) (0.0227)
log(Other debt (X 1K)) -0.0772y -0.0774y -0.0773y -0.0714y -0.0636y
(0.00347) (0.00416) (0.00380) (0.00365) (0.0108)
0:85  LTV < 90 0.0103* 0.0157** 0.0296y 0.0200y -0.0109
(0.00589) (0.00689) (0.00636) (0.00658) (0.0134)
0:90  LTV < 0:95 0.0315y 0.0371y 0.0624y 0.0467y 0.0112
(0.00728) (0.00849) (0.00792) (0.00792) (0.0203)
1(Min.down) 0.115y 0.0924y 0.150y 0.136y 0.0395y
(0.00619) (0.00722) (0.00672) (0.00683) (0.0152)
FICO1 -0.0603y -0.0701y -0.0472y -0.0642y -0.0609y
(0.00536) (0.00621) (0.00588) (0.00585) (0.0135)
FICO2 -0.106y -0.118y -0.0909y -0.109y -0.103y
(0.00527) (0.00617) (0.00578) (0.00574) (0.0134)
FICO3 -0.159y -0.164y -0.140y -0.163y -0.140y
(0.00524) (0.00615) (0.00572) (0.00570) (0.0135)
renter -0.0121** -0.00550 -0.0174y
(0.00527) (0.00612) (0.00582)
parents -0.0627y -0.0659y -0.0653y
(0.00845) (0.0100) (0.00938)
Switcher -0.105y -0.102y -0.0553y -0.0478y -0.149y
(0.00546) (0.00647) (0.00612) (0.00553) (0.0137)
broker -0.175y -0.175y -0.193y -0.190y -0.174y
(0.00487) (0.00586) (0.00531) (0.00514) (0.0137)
specialist 0.0380y 0.0425y 0.0335y -0.0102 0.0415
(0.00818) (0.0103) (0.00827) (0.00778) (0.0525)
HHI (5KM) 0.0824y 0.112y 0.0855y 0.0508** 0.138**
(0.0205) (0.0232) (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0584)
Share branches (5KM) 0.0956y 0.0997y 0.0762y 0.108y 0.102*
(0.0223) (0.0249) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0587)
Constant 1.295y 1.356y 1.046y 1.371y -0.251
(0.256) (0.305) (0.277) (0.274) (0.721)
OBS 105,315 75,329 88,598 91,842 13,473
R2 0.410 0.432 0.412 0.408 0.436
Robust standard errors in parentheses; y p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 8: Regression Results (1999-2004): Broker Equations
Dependent Variable (Selection): Broker (1,0)
Dependent Variable (Outcome): Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
The regressors are the same as in Table 7. The added regressor is Broker share (5KM) which is the market
share of brokers in a 5KM radius of the centroid of each FSA. Column (1) is the full sample while column (2)
looks at new home-buyers and column (3) looks at previous home-buyers.
Full sample New owner Previous owner
VARIABLES Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
Broker share (5KM) -1.092 -1.073 -1.792
(0.0898) (0.0966) (0.3523)
Broker -0.321 -0.291 -0.350
(0.0210) (0.0225) (0.0579)
log(House price (X 100K)) 0.202 -0.282 0.236 -0.285 -0.036 -0.269
(0.0211) (0.0071) (0.0230) (0.0078) (0.0558) (0.0172)
log(Income (X 1K)) -0.320 0.185 -0.336 0.185   -0.151 0.194
(0.0224) (0.0078) (0.0240) (0.0084) (0.0669) (0.0210)
log(Other debt (X 1K)) 0.014 -0.076 -0.00003 0.018 -0.013 -0.070
(0.0100) (0.0034) (0.0102) (0.0036) (0.0325) (0.0104)
0:85  LTV < 90 0.071 0.0128 0.086 0.021 0.032 -0.010
(0.0176) (0.0060) (0.0196) (0.0067) (0.0430) (0.0133)
0:90  LTV < 0:95 0.039 0.0326 0.058 0.0437 -0.041 0.0100
(0.0222) (0.0075) (0.0240) (0.0082) (0.0656) (0.0202)
1(Min.down) 0.127 0.120 0.150 0.135 0.057 0.042
(0.0183) (0.0062) (0.0201) (0.0069) (0.0478) (0.0149)
HHI (5KM) -0.321 0.072 -0.300 0.064 -0.264 0.128
(0.0560) (0.0192) (0.0590) (0.0203) (0.2060) (0.0577)
Share Branches (5KM) -1.223 0.057 -1.234 0.071 -0.978 0.065
(0.0613) (0.0214) (0.0654) (0.0230) (0.1900) (0.0586)
FICO1 -0.0208 -0.0610 -0.003 -0.0627 -0.021 -0.0613
(0.0146) (0.0052) (0.0156) (0.0056) (0.0426) (0.0133)
FICO2 -0.054 -0.108 -0.027 -0.110 -0.115 -0.107
(0.0145) (0.0052) (0.0155) (0.0056) (0.0432) (0.0133)
FICO3 -0.079 -0.162 -0.051 -0.165 -0.160 -0.146





Switcher 1.267 -0.044 1.233 -0.046 1.546 -0.068
(0.0134) (0.0010) (0.0150) (0.0106) (0.0328) (0.0288)
Constant -3.980 0.626 -3.737 0.624 -2.907 0.658
(0.5000) (0.1676) (0.5331) (0.1786) (1.610) (0.4939)
OBS 105315 105315 91842 91842 13473 13473